This paper informs the dialogue on programs to prevent deforestation like REDD+. Effective REDD+ instruments must consider collective action, incentives and preferences for contract attributes. There is currently limited understanding of household preferences for REDD+ contracts. We use a choice experiment (CE) applied to rural Ethiopian communities to understand preferences towards the institutional structure of REDD+ contracts. The results show that respondents care about REDD+ program characteristics with regard to how payments are divided between the households and the communities, the restrictions on using grazing land and the level of payments received per household. We find that perceived costs of restrictions on fuelwood collections are dependent on the quality of local forestry institutions. We find significant regional variation in preferences indicating that REDD+ implementations should be tailored to specific regions. Finally we provide an application of both preference space and WTP-space approaches to estimate WTP in a developing country setting.
Introduction
According to Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005) , approximately 30% of global forest area has been harvested during the last two centuries and 29 countries lost over 90% of their forests. Tropical forest area is decreasing at a rate of over 10 million hectares per year. Virtually all net deforestation occurs in developing countries (Pan et al., 2011) . This rate of deforestation has created concerns for the local people, who largely depend on the forests and forestry products for their livelihood, and the world at large, for the global environmental impact from deforestation.
Over a billion people, mainly in low and lower-middle income countries, directly depend on forests for their livelihoods (Chao, 2012) . Fuelwood for cooking and heating is generally the most important direct-use forest ecosystem service. Nearly half the world's population relies on solid fuels, such as biomass, for cooking (IEA, 2014) and most biomass is harvested from common rather than private forests (Cooke, Kohlin, and Hyde 2008; Bluffstone et al., 2013) . In sub-Saharan Africa, depending on the country, 68% to 90% of the population relies on biomass fuels (Rehfuess, 2006; Smith et al., 2004) and in Ethiopia about 90% regularly use biomass (Beyene et al, 2015) .
Concurrently with the heavy reliance on fuelwood for cooking, climate change has emerged as a major environmental threat (IPCC 2014) . Deforestation and forest degradation accounts for 11%-20% of annual greenhouse gas emissions van der Werfet al. 2009; Chao, 2012; UNEP 2012 ) and the net carbon source from tropical land use change is estimated to be 2.4  0.4 Gigatons per year (Pan et al., 2011) . Therefore preventing deforestation and creating sustainable forest practices becomes vital for both maintaining and improving local livelihoods and mitigating and adapting to climate change.
The UN Collaborative Program on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and
Degradation in Developing (REDD+), is a program being developed to provide incentives to non-Annex 1 countries (non-industrialized countries) to reduce deforestation and forest degradation (Angelsen and Brockhaus, 2009 ). An important question for these programs is how to incorporate the approximately 25% of developing country forests that are managed by communities (World Bank, 2009 ). An estimated 15.5% of global forests are currently under the formal control of communities and community control is increasing (RRI, 2014) . Such community forests, which dominate much of Ethiopia, may have significant carbon sequestration potential that could be incentivized under REDD+, but to improve community forests collective action is required (Bluffstone, 2013; Bluffstone et al., 2013) .
Collective action requires coordination between community members, but as discussed by Ostrom (1990 Ostrom ( , 2000 Ostrom ( , 2009 and Agrawal (2007) and many others, such coordination can be challenging. Different views on the collective action institutional structure, mistrust of other group members, rent-seeking behavior and enforcement issues often exist in forest user groups as they do in most other institutions that rely on collective action. With such complex local institutional environments as backdrops, REDD+ contracts between national or sub-national governments and communities must be made. Little is known, however, about the preferences of rural farmers and landowners for contract attributes or what such contracts should look like.
For example, conditioned on collective action institutional issues, such as those just mentioned, how would community members prefer the REDD+ payments to be divided between households and forest user groups? How does the length of the contract effect adoption? What current practices, such as grazing, firewood collection, are community members willing to give up to receive the payment? These similar issues are likely to be important for the success of REDD+ and other community-focused forest conservation programs.
Filling this information gap and answering the above research questions are important with regard to implementing REDD+ programs and structuring REDD+ contracts. This is specifically true for the second stage of REDD+ (the first stage being the contract at the country and the second stage being the agreements with the local communities). In this study we answer the above research questions by analyzing the preferences for REDD+ contracts using choice experiments (CE) conducted in Ethiopia. We focus on Ethiopia because it presents an ideal case to study the knowledge gap discussed above regarding preferences for REDD+ contracts given the high deforestation rates and ongoing efforts to incorporate REDD+ into Ethiopian land use policy. We use choice experiments in order to be able to calculate preferences for individual contract attributes and, by using a series of attribute and demographic interactions, to analyze trade-offs between attributes, regional effects, and the influence of forest institutional quality on choices. We conduct our experiments in 504 randomly selected households in 36 randomly chosen villages in Amhara, Oromiya and Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples (SNNP) Regional States in Ethiopia, which include over 80% of Ethiopia's population of over 90 million and 70% of forest area.
1
Our results suggest that respondents not surprisingly have strong preferences about how REDD+ contracts are structured. They are concerned about how payments are divided between the households and the communities and they prefer that payments go directly to households rather than to communities. Members like longer contract terms, but are especially wary of restrictions on using forests for grazing, which we find are very costly for villagers. Fuelwood restrictions are less of a concern according to our main effects estimates. However further investigation reveals, that fuelwood restriction costs are highly region-specific and dependent on perceived collective action institutional quality, in particular beliefs about community members following rules.
Though we focus on Ethiopia for this study, the results we find on the preferences for the 1 Regional states are the main sub-federal jurisdiction in Ethiopia.
REDD+ contracts are applicable to many developing countries considering undertaking climate adaptation and mitigation programs like the REDD+ program that involve community managed land. Section 2 of the paper introduces the study site, followed by a review of the key choice experiment literature that underpins our analytical method in Section 3 and a discussion of our sampling and survey design Section 4. Section 5 presents our key results and the final part of the paper discuss implications of our findings and draws out key conclusions.
Study Site
Ethiopia is a low-income REDD+ partner country of over 90 million people. Population pressure has led to the expansion of agricultural activities, livestock grazing and unsustainable consumption of fuel wood and the country's forests are being lost at an alarming rate. Over 80% of the population is subsistence farmers who operate without benefit of irrigation. Livestock are very important parts of household livelihoods, serving as stores of wealth and vehicles for income generation. Grazing of cattle, goats, etc. is generally done on public lands.
All land in Ethiopia is owned by the government, which is a policy that began during the imperial period that ended in 1975. Government ownership of land was intensified under the communist Derg government that was in power from 1975 to 1991. The Derg was deposed in 1991 after a long rebellion, which led to the current government structure. Even after the Derg was deposed, because the government officially retained ownership of land (but allowed private use of land), land redistributions occurred during the 1990s and maybe even later.
As is the case in many low-income countries, there is limited government capacity to control access to public lands. As a result, most public lands are open access and this institutional structure is believed to have contributed to the loss of forest biomass resulting in the current closed canopy forest cover of only about 4% . Recognizing the problems with open access management, in 2000 a forest sector reform was passed and a variety of community-level devolution pilots, experiments and initiatives were launched to improve forest collective action, forest management and ecosystem service outcomes. Participation in REDD+ is a key part of the forest policy reforms.
It is believed that Ethiopia's participation in REDD+ will generate many benefits to the . The Proposal specifically notes that the key aspect of the enabling environment is to "reinforce and clarify the user rights of forest dependent people" as this has been identified as a fundamental prerequisite for sustained protection of the forest. Therefore, with this backdrop Ethiopia presents an ideal opportunity to study preferences and attitudes towards REDD+ contracts. As REDD+ is a prospective program for Ethiopia, an experimental method is most appropriate (and necessary) to study the preferences towards REDD+ contract attributes.
Methods
We use choice experiment surveys, administered to 504 respondents in rural Ethiopia to understand respondents' preferences and willingness to adopt REDD+ contracts. Choice experiments are based on Lancaster (1966) , who argued that consumers obtain utility from the characteristics of good and services rather than the good or service itself. CEs are increasingly used to estimate preferences for environmental good and policies (Boxall et al. 1996 , Louviere et al. 2000 , Dissanayake and Ando 2014 , Witkin et al. 2015 . In a typical CE survey, the respondent repeatedly chooses the preferred choice set from several choice sets. The values appearing in each choice set are identified using experimental design techniques to ensure a balanced representation of values across the choice set. Alpizar et al. (2003) , Hanley et al. (2001) , Hensher et al. (2005) , and Hoyos (2010) provide reviews of the CE methodology.
The standard conditional logit model (CL), which has been used for analyzing discrete choice models for many years, assumes that the respondents have homogeneous preferences (estimate a mean value for the sample for each attribute). To account for heterogeneity of preferences we also use a mixed multinomial logit model (MMNL) 2 that can estimate both a mean and a standard deviation for specified parameters ( Hensher and Greene, 2003; Train, 2003 , Hensher et al. 2005 , Dissanayake 2014 ). Assuming a linear utility, the utility gained by person q from alternative i in choice situation t is given by
where is a vector of attributes. Following standard practice for logit models we assume that is independently and identically distributed extreme value type I. For more details about deriving the logit estimator refer to Dissanayake (2014) .
In choice experiment choice sets it is important to allow the respondent an option to indicate none of the presented options are preferred (to not having the good/policy). Therefore it is standard practice now to include a status-quo option in the choice sets (Hanley et. al. 1998 , Haaijer, et al. 2001 , Birol et. al. 2006 , Blaeij et al. 2007 ). Typically the presented options (say alternatives A and B) are generally closer substitutes with each other than the status-quo option (say alternative C). To account for this difference in substitution between options, the standard approach, and the one we employ, is to use an econometric specification for the mixed multinomial logit model that includes an alternative specific constant (ASC), with the parameter differentiating between the status quo option and the choices that represent deviations from the status quo.
To facilitate interpretation of estimation results, standard practice in the literature is to calculate average marginal willingness to accept (WTA) for a change in each attribute i by dividing the coefficient estimate for each attribute by the coefficient estimate for the payment term, as given in (2) (Henscher et al., 2005 ).
Though the above formulation is standard, some recent work has suggested that taking the ratio of two coefficients can be structurally incorrect when the coefficients are drawn from specific distributions. Specifically Train and Weeks (2005) , Daly, Hess and Train (2011) and Hole and Kolstad (2012) show that ratios of coefficients can have infinite variances. One solution is to reformulation from "preference space" to "WTP space." Equations (1) 
where C is the cost or payment attribute and  is the coefficient on the cost term. Equation (3) can be reformulated by dividing (3) by the coefficient on the cost term,  , to get
which can be simplified as
Equation (5) represents a specification in "WTP Space," because the coefficient estimates are the ratios of the coefficients from specification (3), where
The specification is nonlinear, but can be estimated using both NLOGIT (Greene, 2013 ) and a STATA module by Gu, Hole and Knox (2013) .
Survey Design, Estimation, and Sampling

The Choice Experiment Design
The choice experiment presents respondents with opportunities to express preferences over REDD+ contracts that have the following attributes: Contract payment denominated per household, duration of the contract, percentage of the payment going to the household (as opposed to the community), required reduction in fuelwood and the required reduction in grazing (both in percentages). A larger initial list of attributes was developed based on the REDD+ literature, discussions with local researchers involved with deforestation and local community members, and then refined and pared down based on extensive consultations during 15 different focus groups. A pilot survey was conducted with a convenient sample representing the actual sample and the results from the pilot study were used to refine the survey instrument. The attribute levels and descriptions are provided in Table 1 .
The attributes in the survey allow us to answer the specific research questions regarding individual preferences for REDD+ contracts. As discussed in the introduction this study contributes to the literature on REDD+ by focusing on how REDD+ can be incorporated into community forestry settings. Specifically the attributes in the choice experiment focus on understanding the total amount of the REDD+ payment level and whether community members prefer that REDD+ payments go to forest user groups for community projects or to households.
We also study if community members like longer or shorter contracts and how the respondents view the requirement to give up direct-use ecosystem services effect in exchange for the REDD+ payments. Finally we calculate the marginal willingness to accept for giving up direct-use ecosystem services, specifically for reducing firewood collection and grazing.
The final choice experiment survey instrument includes significant background information about the REDD+ program, a description of the attributes and the levels and seven choice sets where each choice set includes two REDD+ contracts and a status-quo option, The survey also contains a demographic questionnaire. The appendix provides an example of one choice set and the actual text of the background information document read to respondents. These documents were pretested in the field before launching full implementation. For each of the choice sets the respondents chose between the two given alternatives and the status quo option.
We create an efficient experiment design that incorporates both main effects and interaction effects (Adamowicz et al. 1997 , Louviere et al. 2000 . The design for the choice experiment was generated using the SAS macro by Kuhfeld (2010) 3 and achieve a 100% D-efficiency. Given that we are interested in identifying part-worth utilities and also how the levels of attributes effect the preferences for other attributes it is necessary to include the attribute interactions in the experiment design. This allows us to analyze the data using specifications that include attribute interactions terms.
The REDD+ survey design resulted in 84 unique choice sets (Kuhfeld, 2010; Vermeulen et al. 2008) . A block design in which the 84 choice profiles were separated into blocks of six was used to generate the survey instruments, resulting in fourteen unique CE surveys with six questions each. Carlsson et al. (2010) test for learning and ordering effects in CE surveys and show that dropping the first choice question can decrease the error variance of estimates. We follow this suggestion and add an additional choice question before the six choice questions in each questionnaire and drop the first choice question when conducting the analyses to account for possible learning effects. In order to adjust for possible ordering effects, we reversed the order of the questions in half the surveys and therefore obtain 28 unique versions of the CE instrument, each with seven choice sets. Carlsson and Martinsson (2008) investigate the effect of the number of choice sets and the design of the first choice set as context dependence in a choice experiment, and they found no significant impact on estimated marginal willingness to pay.
Econometric Specification
We use a main effects specification and specifications with attribute interaction terms, regional interaction terms, and respondent belief interaction terms to analyze the data. The main effects specification is the standard approach to analyzing choice experiment data. At the same time this model assumes that the levels of one attribute doesn't affect the preferences for other attributes. This may not be true in this application as the percentage of the payment going to the household or the amount of the payment may affect the preferences for the required grazing reduction or fuelwood reduction attributes. To account for these possible interactions between attributes we include an attribute interaction specification in the analysis. Finally, to test for regional heterogeneity and to better understand the preferences for fuelwood reduction we include two specifications that include regional interactions and interactions with beliefs about climate change, institutional structure, and REDD+. The specifications are given in Equation 6 to Equation
9:
The data are analyzed using the clogit and mixlogit commands in STATA for the Conditional Logit and MMNL specifications. The WTP estimation was conducted in STATA using the generalized mixed logit GMNL estimator created by Hole (2013 
Household Characteristics
All three regional states are multi-ethnic and respondents report membership in a total of 9 ethnic groups (one group per household). The most important ethnic groups are Oromo (39%), Amhara (25%) and Wolayta (14% Almost all respondents are farmers (91%) and own an average of 1.8 hectares of land, with a maximum of 10.5 hectares. The sample is therefore one of smallholders, which is typical for the country. As is the case for the country as a whole, in the sample irrigation is unusual, with only 8% of respondents having any irrigated land. Farmers both cultivate and raise animals, with virtually all households having animals, with an average of 5 tropical livestock units (TLU). Table 2 presents results for the main effects specifications analyzed using a conditional logit (CL) model (column 1), a MMNL model (column 2), the attribute interactions specification analyzed using a MMNL model (column 3), the geographical interaction effects specification analyzed using a MMNL model (column 4), and the respondent beliefs interaction effects specification analyzed using a MMNL model (column 5). The results from all five specifications in Table 2 suggest that the percentage of the payment going to the community, the duration of the contract, the required grazing reduction and the payment level are all significant determinants of respondents' willingness to adopt REDD+ contracts. The significant coefficient results are robust across the econometric specifications and have expected signs. These results suggest the following about respondent preferences:
Results
1. As the percentage of the payment going to the household increases, respondents are more likely to choose that option;
2. As the duration of the contract increases, respondents are more likely to choose that option;
3. As the required grazing reduction increases, respondents are less likely to choose that option;
As the payment values (amount) increase, respondents are more likely to choose that option
The attribute interaction effect specification (column 3) indicates that the interaction term for the firewood reduction variable and the payment to the community is significant. Since this variable is negative, it indicates that at higher levels of required firewood reduction, the respondent would require more of the payment to be given to the household (as opposed to the community) compared to lower levels of firewood reduction. Implicitly the respondent is willing to accept larger fuelwood collection restrictions if more of the REDD+ payment comes directly to households.
The significant interaction term between grazing restriction and payment from the attribute interaction specification (column 3) suggests that as the payment level increases respondents are willing to accept a higher grazing restriction (the marginal disutility of grazing decreases). Two of the regional interaction terms in column 4 are significant, implying regional heterogeneity in respondent preferences. In the regional interaction term specification we find the following:
1. Compared to respondents in Oromia (the omitted category), respondents from Amhara require a higher payment when a more of the payment is goes to the community.
2. Respondents from SNNP require a higher payment to reduce grazing.
We find that the required reduction in fuelwood collections is not a significant determinant of willingness to adopt REDD+ contracts in three of the first four specifications. This result is counter to our priors and what was suggested by focus groups and survey pretests. We find, however, that different respondent groups (likely with varying preferences) and beliefs about the enforcement of regulations drive this finding. We include interactions terms based on respondents beliefs in an effort to understand the specific structure of respondents' preferences for the firewood reduction variable. Column 5 in Table 2 presents results from a specification that includes respondent's beliefs related to whether other community members follow rules, if climate change will have an impact on the respondent, and if the REDD program will benefit the respondent.
All the main attributes and two of the interactions terms are significant for this specification. Specifically we find that if respondents believe community members do not follow rules 5 they perceive fuelwood reduction as a cost, but otherwise do not. This finding suggests that the quality of forest user group institutions (as manifested by beliefs about enforcement and the likelihood of the community following rules) affects whether respondents expect that fuelwood reductions mandated as part of REDD+ contracts would actually impose costs on households. We also find that the respondents beliefs about REDD program personal benefits have a significant impacts on the contracts they choose.
<Table 4 Here>
Next we calculate the marginal WTA and include multiple specifications to test for the robustness of the results. Table 4 Table 4 and the full estimation results are provided in Table 5 . Figure 1 shows a comparison of the estimates from both preference space and WTP space and illustrates that there is no significant difference between the marginal WTA results for each attribute obtained using the two methods.
<Table 5 Here>
We see from Table 4 that if the annual REDD+ payment per household increases by an average of about 100 Ethiopian Birr (about $5.00), the proportion of payments to households can be decreased by 5%. We also find that if households are required to reduce their grazing by 10%, they would require an increased average payment of approximately 160 Birr (about $8.00). As already discussed, fuelwood collection reduction is not a significant determinant of REDD+ contract choice for the overall sample but it is perceived as a cost by those who believe that other community members do not follow rules. We calculate the cost of fuelwood collection restriction for this group and find that if households are required to reduce fuelwood collection by 10% they would need an average payment of approximately 110 Birr (about $5.50).
Discussion and Key Policy Conclusions
Reducing Emission from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) is a payment for ecosystem services (PES) system tasked with creating markets for carbon sequestration services (Bluffstone 2013) . Despite the acknowledged importance of local level costs and preferences (e.g.
McKinsey & Co, 2010; Gregorsen et al. 2011) , the information on preferences for programs to prevent deforestation like REDD+, especially in forests with communal/group ownership is extremely limited. In this paper we use choice experiment surveys to understand preferences for REDD+ contracts in rural Ethiopia and verify the robustness of the WTA estimates using the "WTP-Space" approach. The results show that respondents care how REDD+ programs are structured, particularly with regard to restrictions on grazing. A key REDD+ policy question is how to divide up REDD+ payments. Should they go to the community? To households? Or part to households and part to communities?
We find that respondents prefer that payments go to households. This result might suggest that households have a particularly high valuation of cash or they may instead be unwilling to entrust forest user groups with REDD+ payments, perhaps because they mistrust local institutions.
Though no-doubt the value of own-cash is quite high, given the public ownership of land and history of collectivization and land redistributions, we also believe that the second explanation contributes to an unwillingness to pool financial resources. Exactly how local forest institutions interact with government to influence household preferences is a key area for further investigation.
In our belief interaction effects model we also find evidence that the quality of local forest institutions matters. We find evidence that beliefs about the likelihood that community members following rules have important effects on perceptions. Fuelwood is absolutely critical for daily living, but we interpret our results as indicating that the quality of institutions is a very important determinant of whether respondents believe binding fuelwood restrictions will actually be realized under REDD+.
This result, which is very much in line with Ostrom (1990; 2009) , suggests that the strength of institutions and the enforcement of rules can change perceived opportunity costs. It needs to be further investigated if these differences are caused by respondents acknowledging a potential for leakage or some other belief about the role of institutions. Further studies should be conducted that include different forms of enforcement as an attribute. This will allow a better understanding of how the form of enforcement will influence adoption decisions.
We also find that preferences for REDD+ contract attributes depend on the levels of other attributes. We find (not surprisingly) that at higher payment levels respondents are willing to accept a more stringent grazing restrictions (the marginal disutility of grazing decreases) and that at higher levels of required reduction of firewood collection respondents require more of the payment to be given to the household (as opposed to the community). Finally using a regional interaction model we find regional variation in the preferences for the REDD+ contract. This suggests that it is important to design REDD+ contracts at the regional level as opposed at the national level.
As a whole our results suggest scope for implementation of REDD+ in rural Ethiopia.
Careful consideration about the nature and quality of local level collective action institutions are likely to be strong determinants of the elements in REDD+ contracts. Given the likely diversity of those institutions in Ethiopia and around the world, public participation seems to be a particularly important program design element. Our findings also indicate that one-size-fits-all approaches are unlikely to be successful. To help with, or in addition to, the efforts to reduce the amount of carbon that the rich countries are emitting, an international program was created to use the abilities of forests to store carbon to help reduce climate change. As you may know, trees grow by combining sun light, water and carbon from the air. Healthy forests therefore actually remove carbon from the atmosphere, which helps the climate.
Money has been collected from richer countries for the purpose of reducing deforestation and forest degradation in low income countries like Ethiopia. Using these funds it is expected that international organizations will pay money to governments, individuals and communities like yours to reduce deforestation, improve forest quality and capture carbon. There has been no decision to implement REDD+ in your area and to my knowledge there is no plan to do so. It may, however, come to Ethiopia and it is therefore very important to understand what you and others in your community who use and protect forests would like to see in such agreements. That is why we want to ask you for your views. The choice of whether to participate will be made by you and your fellow forest users. Though you and your neighbors may decide to participate in REDD+, there will be no coercion.
If REDD+ were to come to Ethiopia, there will be an opportunity for Ethiopian communities to be paid money to capture carbon from the atmosphere in their forests. There would also be an opportunity for communities to enjoy other benefits from higher quality forests, such as more animals and plants, non-timber forest products and simply the chance to help and protect the forest environment.
REDD+ agreements would be between international organizations interested in stopping climate change and the Government of Ethiopia. The Government would then make an agreement with your community, with active involvement of and some oversight by international organizations. The agreement will specify the responsibilities your community takes on, such as reductions in fuelwood collections and open grazing elimination (if appropriate). All these steps can improve forest quality and increase carbon sequestration. Progress will need to be monitored and verified every year. You may also need to make work and money contributions to your forest user group community in addition to what you are currently doing.
The agreement will also specify the payment in Birr that will be made each month and will detail how those resources can be used. For example, resources coming to the community may be used for community development projects like children's education, health and community recreation. They might also be used to fund household or individual projects administered by the community like support for income generation activities, installation of biogas digesters, purchase of tractors or use of improved seeds and fertilizers, health centers, schools, etc.
Alternatively, resources (or some part) could be divided equally among households in your group. Each household might therefore receive an equal share of the annual REDD+ payment and those funds could be used as each household prefers.
If you are part of a community forest user group (CFUG), this REDD+ agreement would be with the CFUG. If you have not established a CFUG, to participate in REDD+ and receive payments for increasing carbon in your forest you will need to establish a CFUG.
As of now, there are no specific activities related to forest management that focus on REDD+. To participate in REDD+, your CFUG would need to develop or revise its forest management plan to increase carbon sequestration. Monitoring and verification would also need to be included in such plans and as I mentioned, a formal agreement would be developed. The government, probably through the District Forestry Office, with financial resources from international organizations, would provide training and financial support to help you develop these plans. Because international organizations are providing the REDD+ funds, there will be good and open recordkeeping, which will help control any potential mismanagement of community funds. The participation of such international organizations will also contribute to more equitable distributions of benefits among community members.
We emphasize that the main responsibility for organizing the CFUG and its members to meet REDD+ requirements and distribute rewards will be with you and your neighbors. If you and your community would like to participate in REDD+, any conflicts or controversies within your community that block the making and implementation of a REDD+ agreement will need to be resolved. If you and your neighbors would like additional support, depending on the capacity, availability and goodwill in the District Forestry Office, help may be available with organizing your CFUG (if needed) or to improve its operation.
We will now ask you to make 7 choices among possible REDD+ contracts. Each choice will have three options, one of which is the current situation with no REDD+. These options are described by the following attributes:
Annual total REDD+ payment to your community.
These amounts are presented as Birr per household per month (to calculate the total payment, multiply the per household amount by the number of households in your community)
The portion of REDD+ payments that go to communities for community projects, or equally divided between households in your group or half goes to community and half to households
The word after the word "community" is the portion going to communities and the word after the word "households" is the portion to households like yours.
REDD+ commitment period in years
REDD+ required fuelwood reduction measured as a portion of your current use
Open grazing is prohibited (given as a percentage reduction)
Do you have any questions?
